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Abstract 
We increasingly live in a world where there is a balance between the rights to privacy and the requirements for 
consent, and the rights of society to protect itself. Within this world, there is an ever-increasing requirement to 
protect the identities involved within financial transactions, but this makes things increasingly difficult for law 
enforcement agencies, especially in terms of financial fraud and money laundering. This paper reviews the state-
of-the-art in terms of the methods of privacy that are being used within cryptocurrency transactions, and in the 
challenges that law enforcement face. 
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1. Introduction 
Mergenovna et al [1] defined the increasing challenges 
of investigating money laundering and financing 
terrorism, as cryptocurrencies are increasingly used to 
hide the tracks of these crimes. Some criminals have 
even defended their actions against criminal activity 
by defining that the transactions were not of a 
financial nature [2]. While many current 
cryptocurrencies provided pseudo-anonymous 
identifiers, several are now developing anonymisation 
layers which hide both the sender the recipient and 
the cost of a transaction. This anonymisation will 
make life increasing difficult in detecting and 
investigating a range of crimes. 
As we have public blockchains, the strive for 
anonymisation in both the transaction and processing 
is a key element for protecting privacy and preserving 
consent. Monero is one currency which has taken a 
lead on this, and which uses ring signatures and stealth 
addresses. There is also a rise of anonymised 
processing, such as with zk-Snarks [3]. These 
mechanisms now support the hiding of the core 
information of a transaction, but where it is possible 
to not double spend or spend more currency that has 
been allocated to a user. 
2. Background 
In a traditional finance infrastructure, Bob trusts his 
bank (Bank A) and Alice trusts her bank (Bank B). A 
transfer of funds involves Bob finding out the 
identifier of Alice’s bank (such as their sort code) and 
for her account identifier. The transfer of funds then 
involves him informing his bank that he wants to 
transfer the funds to Alice (Figure 1). Bob’s bank then 
checks the transaction, and if it is valid, his account 
will be debited by the defined amount. His bank will 
then forward the transaction to Bank B, and where 
Alice’s bank will credit her account. In this way, both 
Bank A and Bank B have a ledger which can be 
checked for the transaction. This method works well 
in investigating crime, as each bank can report on 
Bob and Alice’s transactions, and also if they see any 
unusual transactions. 
 
 
Fig. 1. Traditional banking model 
 
The cyberpunks of the 1990s started to question the 
requirements for banks to provide the intermediate 
exchange, especially in the profits that banks made 
from the transactions [4]. Their approach was to use 
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a publicly available ledger - the blockchain - and then sign for 
transactions with public key encryption. Miners could then 
compete to create a consensus for the recent transactions and the 
winner would add a block onto the blockchain. 
Within the Bitcoin infrastructure, Bob and Alice each generate a 
private key and then derive an associated public key. This public 
key is then used to create a public identification address for 
transactions (Figure 2). When Bob now wants to send Alice some 
funds, he determines her public address and then creates a 
transaction to send her a number of bitcoins (Figure 3). This is then 
signed with his private key and then picked up by miners who will 
gather together all the other recent transactions, and create a 
consensus for the transactions to be added to a new block on the 
blockchain. Before this can happen, the transaction needs to be 
checked to see if Bob has enough bitcoins in his account to pay 
Alice. This checking is the reason that the transactions need to be 
public, as the miners cannot process the transaction if Bob does 
not have enough funds to pay Alice. 
 
Fig. 2. Bitcoin address creation 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3. Basic blockchain process 
At the time of the creation of the bitcoin network, there were no 
feasible methods which could hide the fact that Bob was the payer 
and Alice was the payee. A pseudo-ID is then used to match Bob 
and Alice to a public address. While difficult to match the 
identifiers, law enforcement can at least trace known addresses for 
their transactions. A worry with this model, though, is that the 
funds will never hit a bank account unless there is a cash out for 
funds into a fiat currency. This type of approach thus worries both 
tax raising authorities and law enforcement. For this reason, many 
governments around the world are now looking to regulate for 
cryptocurrencies, and thus provide an opportunity to audit their 
flows. A concern would be that it is possible to over regulate, and 
thus stifle innovation. 
3. Investigator Challenges 
The new challenge for investigators is to understand the technical 
process that occurs during the transaction methods for each 
cryptocurrency algorithm. This understanding could range from 
the difference in the transaction system for Bitcoin-style systems 
to the state-based smart contract systems of Ethereum. The 
advancement in the methods used also increases the challenge for 
investigation, as Ethereum moves towards state channels, Plasma, 
Sharding, and upgrades to EWASM (Ethereum flavored 
WebAssembly) from the EVM (Ethereum Virtual Machine). There 
are also a number of challenges that investigators will need to admit 
defeat on and work with companies that have deeper visibility and 
resources to solve problems. Chainalysis [5] and Elliptic [6] are 
examples of market leaders in the field of cryptocurrency 
investigation and monitoring. They use addressing information 
that they are able to obtain that is not visible to an investigator 
using block explorers and OSINT (Open-source intelligence) 
techniques. This information is provided in products they provide 
that can point to services where further investigative leads can be 
explored. Law enforcement would have to build bespoke 
infrastructure to scrape and construct complex data structures to 
have visibility of this kind. 
The emergence of new crypto-economies is greater than those of 
currency and cash out. The ability to buy real estate or hire property 
for rentals shows how far this internet money has come in a 
relatively short period of time. Purchasing of consumer goods is 
possible through direct purchase, intermediaries, gift schemes / 
Cards, debit cryptocurrency cards. Although as wildly reported the 
license for Wavecrest was removed by Visa, disabling huge 
numbers of cryptocurrency debit card schemes that had allowed 
transfers of cryptocurrency to cards. There are however a number 
of similar alternatives still available worldwide and are likely to 
emerge with stronger KYC (Know Your Customer)/AML (Anti-
money laundering) T&Cs. As projects look to allow cryptocurrency 
to pay using applications with nearfield technology the future will 
likely see a disruptive innovation take hold [7]. This already diverse 
use of assets details only a fraction of the usage that is possible now 
and certainly in future blockchain use cases. Local bitcoins also deal 
in peer to peer sharing that offers the exchange models of an online 
user to online user but also the ability to meeting in the street to 
exchange cash for cryptocurrency. This enables the ability for more 
users to become engaged and purchase, but it is not without its 
flaws as those subject to fraud and deceit would attest. 
Centralised exchange AML/KYC region 
A cryptocurrency exchange generally can be considered a 
centralised exchange. This is controlled by a central operator a 
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business. The exchange will hold the private keys and allows users 
to create accounts and pay in FIAT currency for cryptocurrency. 
Cryptocurrency exchanges range in the services that they offer to 
consumers. In basic terms purchasing from FIAT, US dollars to 
crypto (cryptocurrency) and the ability to exchange one 
cryptocurrency to another, such as swapping BTC Bitcoin to ETH 
Ethereum for a percentage fee. Many centralised services have 
more advanced services built into the platforms either as built-in 
additional options or as other products. These additional services 
mirror products that are associated with FIAT trading such as 
leveraging, margin lending, advanced stop loss and profit taking 
options. The exchanges provide advanced graphing and metrics for 
the currency pairings. 
Exchanges have changed considerably over the last few years in its 
adoption of KYC/AML (Know Your Customer/Anti-Money 
Laundering). It was possible to sign up for an account and cash in 
and out with very little or no details retained by exchanges other 
than an e-mail address. Exchanges, however, are now very large 
profitable businesses so it makes sense to apply due diligence and 
align to similar financial institutions. The space is unregulated and 
cryptocurrency has a shadow of illicit use from Silk road and its 
early use on the dark web. The introduction of self-regulation and 
due diligence is certainly a step in the right direction as the industry 
expands and large financial institutions are investing, interacting 
and in some cases, are now operating in the cryptocurrency 
financial industry. KYC now generally includes e-mail addresses, 
government issued photo id, home utility bills and often a photo 
holding the ID. Centralised exchanges are split into those based in 
KYC/AML friendly countries with high standards of AML 
legislation that will operate to high standards. Exchanges operating 
in these areas are aware that failure to adhere to expected standards 
will raise the spectre of compulsive regulation. Centralised 
exchanges expose the customers to risk if operated in a reckless 
manner such as BTC-E and MtGox. As these exchanges pull in 
vast amounts of customers as demonstrated by the relatively new 
exchange Binance, announcing higher profits than Germany’s top 
bank making 200 million dollars in the same period. 
Centralised exchange non-regulated area 
The non-regulated regions offer the same services discussed in the 
previous section. The difference is that in regions where traditional 
money laundering occurs it is highly likely that these regions will 
be preferred for crypto laundering. If the region will not enforce or 
operate with law enforcement with international financial 
institutions, then it is unlikely to push up the standards for this new 
financial adoption. These regions will also be influenced by 
government control, corruption, influence, destabilised 
governments or inefficient government regimes. In the coming 
years, it will be telling as investigations unravel across the globe to 
where the dirty cash falls out of the system. Will the traditional 
money laundering regions retain the higher rates of fraudulent 
activity? 
Decentralised exchange 
Centralised exchanges hold the private keys for the users so they 
are not secure and lack complete control for the user. In contrast 
decentralised exchanges offer a service that enables peer to peer 
trading without the need for an intermediary infrastructure. The 
loss of funds from centralised services has been observed in a 
number of attacks from direct theft from servers to social 
engineering, phishing, and brute force password attacks on the user 
accounts. There are a number of variations on decentralised 
exchanges where the infrastructure and appearance offers a peer to 
peer trade but would not be a truly decentralised exchange [8]. 
There are multi chain peer to peer trading pairs that allow Bitcoin 
and Ethereum trading. True Ethereum/ERC20 token 
decentralised exchanges are hosted as Ethereum Dapps and 
complete the exchange using smart contacts. 
Atomic swaps are cross chain interactions that guarantee either a 
safe transaction or complete refund to both parties. This allows a 
smart contract exchange that posts a deposit and then an exchange 
where both parties cryptocurrency is contained in the system. This 
design is essential as there are no risks to funds from the collapse 
of the exchange, server breach or bad actors. 
A decentralised exchange can perform the functions of an 
exchange trading with the ability to create orders for buy and sell 
with advanced features. 
Swaps, pairs and Shape-shifting 
There are a number of services that allow the exchange of tokens 
from one to another Shapeshift is one of the largest services of this 
type. The service has numerous methods of exchange from its own 
web service, partnerships with wallet providers and merchant 
services. The service doesn’t require KYC information identifier or 
an account it is a simple exchange. Criminal use of this service is 
documented in high profile cyber incidents such as WannaCry and 
the DAO hack [9], [10]. 
There are a number of exchanges that operate these types of basic 
trading swap such as Changelly or Coinmotion. These services 
operate with low user friction and allow chain hopping, swapping 
out from Bitcoin to Ethereum or Monero for example. This chain 
hopping is often used to obfuscate and frustrate law enforcement 
activity. Shapeshift have however recently implemented a new 
membership token that includes the on-boarding of customers and 
trading limits for unregistered members. This appears to be more 
of a move towards a KYC/AML stance with incentives of better 
rates and features [11]. 
Mixers tumblers and fogging 
The use of mixers and tumbling services have become somewhat 
less popular than at the peak of the Silk Road market. These are 
still likely to remain as a constant as there is a still a requirement by 
some users to add additional layers of security and privacy. The 
effectiveness of mixers is questionable and certainly is costlier for 
those users submitting to these services. There are a number of 
tumblers and mixers using different methods to achieve 
obfuscation [12] [13] [14]. 
Cryptocurrency Betting and gambling 
Money laundering has traditionally used betting and gambling in 
order to place money back into the system to move as legitimate 
money. This model is still used in the cryptocurrency and a large 
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number of gambling sites and services. These include the 
distribution of illegally obtained funds to compromised gambling 
services such as a darknet world cup gambling ring in China [15]. 
Cryptocurrency (ATM) Automated Teller Machine 
There are a number of crypto-currency ATM machine networks 
that allow for the debit and credit of cryptocurrency. These support 
Bitcoin and a number of alternative currencies such as Ethereum 
and Litecoin they are however still relatively small in number and 
use. 
Decentralised market places 
There are new emerging decentralised market places that aim to 
replace “E-Bay” and Amazon based on decentralised networks and 
operating without centralised services. These new marketplaces 
offer customers safe peer to peer trading of goods without 
dissolving their rights to privacy and targeted advertising. The 
purchase of goods through cryptocurrency offers a genuine 
distributed purchase allowing the customer control. 
Stablecoins 
The rise of a number of stable coins now allows the ability to cash 
in and out of currencies when the market fluctuates. This solves a 
problem that would see ill-gotten gains fluctuate if remaining in the 
unstable currency. Previously the funds would be required to be 
cashed out quickly to protect the value of the asset. Stable coins 
allow the user to bank the value, the risk then lies with the validity 
of the asset [16]. If the stable coin suffers a crash, then the value is 
clearly lost. 
4 Privacy 
A number of coins are using complex zkSNARK (zero- knowledge 
succinct non-interactive argument of knowledge) and STARK 
technologies to complete cryptographically strong transactions. 
These include value transfers and more complex smart contract 
transactions. Zcash and Monero are renowned for their privacy 
enhancing algorithms and novel ring signatures. Zcash, however, 
has seen a decline in the number of private transactions operated, 
with most of the transactions remaining transparent [17]. In 
contrast, Monero has been lauded as the criminals go-to choice for 
the privacy-centric coin [18]. There are a number of reports and 
instances that reference Monero but none more impactive than the 
WannaCry ransomware attack that hit the NHS and others causing 
countrywide disruption [19] [20]. 
Monero hides the sender using a ring signature, and the receiver 
using a stealth address. A ring signature is a digital signature that is 
created by a member of a group which each have their own keys. 
It is then not possible to determine the person in the group who 
has created the signature. The method of ring signatures was 
initially created by Ron Rivest, et al 2001 [21], and in their paper, 
they proposed the White house leak dilemma. To hide the 
recipient, Bob - who is part of the ring - initiates a conversation 
with Victor, after which Victor will know the address which Bob 
will use to send the transaction to. This conversational creates a 
new private key for Victor and an associated public address. Bob 
will then send his transaction to Victor to this newly created public 
address. Victor will then have the new private key which can then 
be used to transfer the funds to another account. 
In a ring signature, we define a group of entities who each have 
their own public/private key pairs of (P1, S1), (P2, S2),...,(Pn, Sn). 
If we want an entity i to sign a message (message), they use their 
own secret key (si), but the public keys of the others in the group 
(m,si,P1...Pn). It should then be possible to check the validity of 
the group by knowing the public key of the group, but not possible 
to determine a valid signature if there is no knowledge of the 
private keys within the group. 
So, let’s say that Trent, Bob, Eve and Alice are in a group, and they 
each have their own public and secret keys. Bob now wants to sign 
a message from the group. He initially generates a random value v, 
and then generates random values (xi) for each of the other 
participants but takes his own secret key (si) and uses it to 
determine a different secret key, and which reverse of the 
encryption function. He now takes the message and takes a hash 
of it, and thus creates a key (k). This key will be used with 
symmetric encryption to encrypt each of the elements of the ring 
(Ek), and then each element of the ring uses an EX-OR function 
from the previous element (Figure 4). 
Each of the random values for the other participants is then 
encrypted with the public key of the given participant. Bob then 
computes the value of ys in order to create the ring (the result of 
the ring must equal v). He will then inverse this value to produce 
the equivalent private key (xs). Bob now releases the overall 
signature, and the random x values, along with the computed secret 
key. To check the signature, the receive just computes the ring and 
checks that the result matches the sent signature. 
 
Fig. 4. Ring signature 
RingCT 
Monero initially adopted the Borromean ring signature [22], but 
have since migrated to a new method: Multi- layered Linkable 
Spontaneous Anonymous Group signature. This method hides the 
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transaction amount and the identity of the payer and recipient. It is 
now known as RingCT (Ring Confidential Transactions) and was 
rolled-out in January 2017 and mandatory for all transactions from 
September 2017 [23]. For law enforcement, the implementation of 
RingCT makes the usage of cryptocurrency transactions 
increasingly difficult, as they hide both the sender and recipient of 
the transaction. 
5 The Solution? 
Our current financial infrastructure has existed for centuries and 
integrates with global and national financial regulations. A key 
focus for these regulations is often around anti-money laundering 
(AML), gathering taxes, and in the detection of financial fraud. 
Financial organisations must thus report on suspicious 
transactions, or where there are investigations on customers. 
Within a cryptocurrency world, there can often be little traces of 
financial transactions, and this is a major concern of many 
governments and law enforcement agencies around the world. 
Some criminals have even defended their actions against criminal 
activity by defining that the transactions were not of a financial 
nature [2]. 
In the blockchain ecosystem, there are significant efforts to 
anonymise cryptocurrency transactions, which include 
cryptocurrencies such as zCash and Monero. This anonymization 
is required with the rise of public blockchains and the increasing 
regulatory requirements for privacy and consent on the blockchain. 
Current methods of anonymisation include the usage of ring 
signatures and stealth addresses. The solution to this problem is to 
increasingly focus on anonymising the blockchain layer, but to map 
regulatory and statutory environments on top of the anonymisation 
layer, and which will provide audit trails with the revealing of the 
mapping from the regulatory layer into the anonymisation layer. In 
Figure 5, we see an anonymised layer within the blockchain 
infrastructure and where the transaction sources and destinations 
are hidden, but the upper-level layer is then defined where real 
identifies will then be mapped into the anonymised infrastructure. 
The investigation would thus happen at the upper layer, and where 
the regulatory infrastructure in a country would define that all 
transactions would be logged from an anonymised identity to a real 
identity. 
 
 
Fig. 5. Regulatory mapping 
 
6. Conclusions 
The strive for anonymisation within the blockchain infrastructure 
will continue, and thus the long-term goal must be to start to 
regulate for the mapping of real identity into anonymised ones. The 
software which produces the transactions will thus have to keep a 
track for the mapping of a sovereign identity to anonymised one. 
Only with strong cryptography can we make sure that this is 
implemented in a trusted way. 
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